A New Formulation of Predicative Second Order Logic by Cocchiarella, Nino
A NEW FORMULATION OF PREDICATIVE SECOND 
ORDER LOGIC (1) 
Nino CoccHIARELLA 
Indiana University 
In what follows, a predicative second order logic is for­
mulated and shown to be complete with respect to the pro­
posed model theoretic semantics. The logic differs in certain 
fundamental ways from the system formulated by Church in 
{1], § 58. The more important differences are not�d and dis­
cussed throughout the present paper. A more specialized mo­
tivation for the new formulation is outlined in § 2. 
In regard to the motivation for Church's formulation, this 
will be found in its natural extension to ramified type 'theory 
(without the axiom of reducibility). Within this larger frame­
work, the theory of predication represented by such a for­
mulation can be seen to be constructive: higher order entities 
are constructible from entities of lower order, with real, non­
constructed individuals as the entities of lowest order. Set 
theory, to whatever extent it is representable in the frame­
work, appears in the ramified hierarchy only after proposi­
tional functions are allowed to be arguments of third and 
higher order predicates. To introduce sets as real, non-con­
strud'ed individuals of lowest order would be antithetical to 
the framework's constructive theory of predication and in 
violation of its philosophical motivation. 
Ramified type theory, the natural framework for Church's 
formulation of predicative second order logic, was Russell's 
alternative to Frege's Begriifsschrift, which by Russell's para­
dox of membership was shown to be inconsistent. Russell's 
paradox of predication (i, however, is the form of the para­
dox to which Russell himself responded in his formulation of 
ramified type theory. This was because Russell, unlike Frege, 
came to construe all sentences about sets (classes) and their 
properties as reducible to (higher order) sentences about pro­
positional functions and their functions, where propositional 
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 functions are always indicated by predicates (or open wffs)
 and never by expressions for individuals.
 Frege, however, in radical contradistinction to any such
 hierarchy, held to a realist theory of predication according to
 which the entities indicated by predicates (or open wffs) could
 never themselves be arguments of predicates. (s) Such entities,
 also called properties or concepts, were said to be "unsa-
 turated." Sets, or the extensions of properties, however, were
 saturated objects and could themselves be arguments of pre-
 dicates. In other words, sets in this framework are real, non-
 constructed individuals.
 Frege's theory (or a variant thereof) finds its natural repre-
 sentation in an applied form of standard second order logic
 with set-abstraction (for the representation of extensions of
 properties) as an individual term making operation. No exten-
 sion fo third and higher order logic is permitted, being in
 strict violation of the framework's theory of predication. Sets
 are indicated here by (complex) individual expressions and are
 therefore arguments of predicates. Properties and relations,
 however, though quantified over, are indicated by predicate
 expressions (or open wffs) which are not allowed to occupy
 the nominal or argument positions of predicates ,or in general
 the (nominal) argument positions of (open) wffs occupied by
 individual variables. Russell's paradox oi membership, but not
 his paradox of predication, is formulable in this framework.
 However, the derivation of a contradiction requires, as shown
 in § 2 below, quantification over impredicatively specified
 properties and relations, which of course is allowed in stan-
 dard second order logic. On the other hand, with quantifiers
 ranging over only predicatively specifiable properties and re-
 lations as in the predicative second-order logic formulated
 here, Russell's argument fails to generate a contradiction and
 merely shows instead that membership is not a predicative
 relation. This naturally suggests a reformulation of Frege's
 theory of predication to include a predicative second order
 logic such as the system developed here with quantifiers dis-
 tinguished to range over only predicative properties and rela-
 tions and to restate the included set theory appropriately. (This
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 need not necessarily exclude standard quantifiers ranging
 over all properties and relations, whether predicatively speci-
 fied or not.)
 Essential to this proposal, however, is a view of the predi-
 cative/impredicative distinction radically different from that
 found in ramified type theory - and hence in Church's for-
 mulation of predicative second order logic. The latter frame-
 work (barring the axiom of reducibility) represents a con-
 structive theory of predication that rules out all manner of
 categorial content (indicated by bound predicate variables) or
 logistic efficacy for impredicative contexts. In the proposed,
 modified Fregean theory, however, impredicative contexts
 (wffs) are allowed to have logistic efficacy - and perhaps
 even categorial content if standard quantifiers ranging over
 all properties and relations are retained as well.
 If, on the one hand, only quantifiers for predicatively speci-
 fiable properties and relations are allowed, then in this new
 formulation of predicative second order logic impredicative
 contexts - which in general will contain free (schematic) pre-
 dicate variables or certain predicate constants - will be syn-
 categorematic expressions, since they will not then be permis-
 sible substituends of generalized predicate variables. This does
 not mean that they must then be accorded null content. They
 may instead represent logical or formal content variant to
 what Frege calls second and third level "concepts". (4) This
 logical content would in effect be the basis of their logistic
 efficacy. (5)
 If, on the other hand, these impredicative contexts are to
 be given categorial content by retaining standard quantifiers,
 then care must be made to distinguish these quantifiers from
 those ranging over only predicatively specifiable properties
 and relations. Both kinds of quantifiers will bind the same
 variables, but impredicative wffs will be permissible substi-
 tuends only of variables bound by the one quantifier. (*) They
 remain impermissible substituends of variables bound by the
 quantifiers for predicative properties and relations.
 In the system to be formulated here we are concerned only
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 with the first of the above alternatives, although once for-
 mulated it is easily extended to the richer framework. (7)
 § 1 Terminology:
 For our new formulation of predicative second order logic
 we take as primitive logical constants the (material) condi-
 tional sign, the negation sign, ~ ; the universal quantifier
 for quantification over individuals, A; and A! ,the universal
 quantifier for quantification over predicative properties and
 relations. Since indiscernibili ty with respect to predicative
 properties will not suffice for full substitutivity, we shall also
 take s as a primitive identity sign. Other logical constants
 are understood to be defined (in the syntactical metalanguage)
 in the usual manner.
 We assume a denumerable list of pairwise distinct individual
 variables and, for each positive integer n, a similar list of
 n-place predicate variables. We shall use 'a', 'ß', 'y' (in the syn-
 tactical metalanguage) to refer to individual variables, ža', 'q',
 'o' to refer to predicate variables, and '[¡l', V (occasionally) to
 refer to both individual and predicate variables.
 The only non-logical or descriptive constants we shall con-
 cern ourselves with here are individual and n-place predicate
 constants, for arbitrary positive integers n. By a language we
 understand a set of such descriptive constants.
 Where L is a language, the terms of L are the individual
 variables and the individual constants in L. The atomic wffs
 of L are either identity formulas of the form £=tļ, where Ç, iļ
 are terms of L, or simple predications of the form jt(Çi,. . .,tn),
 where it is either an n-place predicate variable or an n-place
 predicate constant in L, and Çi,...,Çn are terms of L. The wffs of
 L constitute the smallest set containing the atomic wffs of L
 and closed under the formation of conditionals, negations and
 (universal) generalizations of wffs by either A affixed to an
 individual variable or A ! affixed to a predicate variable. We
 shall use X, 'rļ' (in the syntactical metalanguage) to refer
 to terms and *<p', to refer to wffs. Bondage and freedom
 of (occurrences of) variables in wffs is understood in the usual
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 way as well as proper substitution of a term for an individual
 variable in a wff. If Ç can be properly substituted for a, then
 a
 cp[j.] is the wff resulting from this substitution; but if Ç cannot
 a
 be properly substituted for a in <p, then cp[^] is just q> itself. In
 regard to the proper substitution of wffs for predicate variables
 we adopt the definition and notation given in Church, op. cit.,




 by <p[ ], which is used only when n-place predicate variables
 Jt
 or constants are substituted for n-place predicate variables.
 § 2 Motivation:
 Before proceeding to the new formulation of predicative
 second order logic which is intended to reflect the suggested
 modified Fregean theory of predication, let us briefly consider
 the original framework of (pure) standard second order logic
 with set-abstraction as an individual term making operation.
 Ignore for the moment A!, the quantifier for predicative pro-
 perties and relations, and instead affix A to predicate as well
 as individual variables, understanding it then to range over
 all properties and relations, whether predicatively specified
 or not. Impredicative properties and relations are acknow-
 ledged in this logic via the comprehension principle:
 (CP) VnAai... Aan[jt(ai,...,an) **<p]
 where <p is any wff of (pure) standard second order logic in
 which the n-place (n a positive integer) predicate variable n
 has no (free) occurrences and ai,...,an are among the distinct
 individual variables occurring free in qp. If <p contains essential
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 occurrences of bound predicate variables (8), (p is understood
 to represent an impredicative n-ary relation (or property if
 n = 'i') ; and (CP) posits the (categorial) existence of this n-ary
 impredicative relation. (®)
 The sense in which the (categorially) posited n-ary relation
 represented by qp, with respect to the variables ai,...,an (as
 argument indicators), is impredicative (relative to the system
 in question) can perhaps be best grasped when cp contains
 essential occurrences of bound n-place predicate variables; for
 then, on the assumption that these occurrences really are es-
 sential, that relation can be comprehended in the system only
 by a wff which must contain bound occurrences of a variable
 of which that relation is itself a value, or, equivalently, of
 which that wff is itself a substituend (with respect to the indi-
 vidual variables in question). (10) If the essential occurrences
 of bound predicate variables in qp are of a degree k other than
 n, then the posited n-ary relation's impredicativity can be
 grasped derivatively through considering (p relative now to
 the arguments ai,...,ak if k<n, or if n<k through considering
 (qp /' an + 1 = an + 1 ak = ak) , where an + i,...,ak are new to (p.
 The k-ary relation now posited by (CP) is seen to be impre-
 dicative in the preceding direct sense since it is represented
 by a wff containing an essential occurrence of a variable of
 which it is a value, and its systematic or provable connection
 with the n-ary relation in question as the latter's contraction
 or expansion indicates the sense in which this latter relation
 must therefore also be impredicative.
 This sense of impredicativity, it should be noted, is imma-
 nent to the logistic system in question, standard second order
 logic in the present case, since it depends on what is provable
 in the pure form of that system. (") Immanence, however, does
 not signify nullity of content. The point rather is that such
 content as impredicativity does contain is not independent of
 the logical structure which is imputed to properties and rela-
 tions by the logistic system in question.
 Accordingly, the restriction to the pure for mof the system
 is relevant here, since otherwise a predicate constant can al-
 ways be introduced to (contingently) represent the relation in
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 question (in some particular model), in which case the relation
 can trivially be represented by a wff containing no bound
 predicate variables. But whether a property or relation is re-
 presented as predicative or impredicative in a logistic system
 is not a contingent issue involving an "external" relation be-
 tween the system and that property or relation, the way, for
 example, whether a property is possessed or not might be.
 Rather, because of the immanency of impredicativity, the re-
 lationship involved is an "internal" one concerning the logical
 structure which is imputed to the property or relation by the
 system.
 Let us now consider the role of set-abstraction in the pre-
 sent framework. Applied to an (open) wff and a variable (as
 argument indicator), set-abstraction is intended to result in the
 extension of the property represented by that wff with respect
 to that variable. Existentially positing a membership relation
 satisfying extensionality and the unrestricted form of the con-
 version principle:
 (Conv) AjtAa[ae{ß:jt(ß) } <-» jt(ct)]
 results in a system variant to Frege's (12), and its inconsistency
 is the result of Russell's paradox of membership. Note how-
 ever that an impredicative instance of (CP) is required for
 the derivation of this paradox. The instance in question posits
 that non-self -membership is a property (ls) :
 VjiAa[jr(a) <-»a^a]
 For it is only this posit which justifies instantiating (Conv) to
 a^a as a substituend of the generalized 1 -place predicate va-
 riable and thereby obtain Russell's contradiction (via a fur-
 ther instantiation of the individual variable to the term
 {a:a^a}. (14) Observe, however, that the property of non-self-
 membership is imputed some complexity by the system and
 that that complexity is at least two-fold: it is the complement
 of the property of self-membership which itself is already im-
 puted complexity in being a (reflexive) relational property
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 based upon the impredicatively specified membership relation.
 That membership is impredicative is obvious since its charac-
 terization or imputed structure in the present system involves
 a wff, (Conv), with an essential occurrence of a bound predi-
 cate variable. (15) Furthermore, it is a presumed principle that
 a reflexive relational property is impredicative if the rela-
 tion it is based upon is impredicative. Accordingly, both self-
 membership and its complement, non-self-membership, are
 impredicative properties. Thus Russell's argument, as claimed
 above, requires an impredicative instance of (CP) for its vali-
 dation. (16)
 In contrast to the validation procedures of standard second
 order logic with its commitment to categorial impredicativity,
 let us consider now the variant of predicative second order
 logic to be developed here, retaining for the present set-ab-
 straction as an individual term making operation. We return
 to affixing A ! rather than A to predicate variables and under-
 stand variables bound thereby to range over only predicative
 properties and relations. Free predicate variables, however,
 and predicate constants as well in applied forms of the system,
 may refer to either impredicative or predicative properties and
 relations as their values. Impredicativity is in this way ac-
 corded only syncategorial existence.
 This semantic distinction between bound predicate varia-
 bles on the one hand and, on the other, free predicate variables
 and constants is analogous to certain formulations of first
 order modal logic such as that of Kripke [4]. In the latter,
 bound occurrences of individual variables refer only to objects
 existing in the world in question while free occurrences of in-
 dividual variables, and individual constants as well, refer to
 possible individuals that need not exist in that world. In both
 sorts of context it is false to claim, as for example Kripke has
 claimed (op. cit., p. 89), that assertion of wffs containing free
 variables is at best a convenience which can always be re-
 placed by assertion of the universal closure of these wffs.
 In addition, because in the present system a wff containing
 no bound predicate variables may contain free predicate va-
 riables or constants which may in a given model refer to
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 impredicative properties or relations, we must not confuse or
 identify the semantical or ontological predicative/impredica-
 tive distinction with the purely syntactical distinction between
 wffs containing and wffs not containing essential occurrences
 of bound predicate variables. In Church's formulation, no pa-
 rallel distinction is to be drawn: free as well as bound predi-
 cate variables and predicate constants, one and all, refer only
 to predicative properties and relations.
 In the present formulation, the comprehension principle for
 predicative properties and relations takes the form:
 (CP!) Alai... A !akV!ji/'ai... Aan[jt(ai,...,an) «-»cp]
 where qp is a wff in which no predicate constants or the identity
 sign occur and in which no predicate variable has a bound
 occurrence, 0i,...,0k are all the predicate variables occurring
 (free) in cp, ai,...,an are among the distinct individual variables
 occurring free in qp, and Jt is an n-place predicate variable
 which does not occur in qp. Other than replacing (CP) by (CP!)
 and using A! in place of A when affixed to predicate varia-
 bles, the remaining axioms of second oredr logic are retained
 in this system. Identity, however, must here be represented by
 a primitive logical constant (or 2-place predicate constant re-
 presenting a syncategorial impredicative relation) satisfying
 reflexivity and full substitutivity. Indiscernibility with respect
 to predicate properties is of course a necessary but not also
 a sufficient condition for identity; and, accordingly, indiscer-
 nibility cannot suffice here as a definition for identity.
 Unlike Church's formulation, in the present system the prin-
 ciple of universal instantiation of wffs for generalized predi-
 cate variables has a qualified form even when the substituend
 contains no bound predicate variables:
 (UI!) V!o Aai... A<Xn[a(ai,...,an) <-»qp] - » [Aījnļj- »
 !Al...An[(l
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 (where a does not occur free in cp). The reason for this quali-
 fication is that the wff <p may contain free occurrences of pre-
 dicate variables, or a predicate constant, which refer to im-
 predicative properties or relations. Only by stipulating that (p,
 relative to the variables ai,...,an, (as argument indicators) re-
 presents an n-ary predicative relation are we justified in taking
 q) to be a permissible substituend of a generalized n-place pre-
 dicate variable - for as such a substituend qp, relative to the
 variables ai,...,an, then represents a value of that variable.
 This explains, furthermore, the restriction in (CP!) that (p con-
 tain no predicate constants (or the identity sign). Were such
 an instance of (CP!) desired because the embedded constant
 represented a predicative property or relation after all, then
 it can be derived from (UI!), on the assumption that the quali-
 fying antecedent of (UI!) is satisfied for that constant. Such an
 assumption would normally be stipulated in the form of a
 meaning postulate.
 Another variant of the instantiation law for predicate vari-
 ables is the following consequence of (UI!) and (CP!):
 (UI!2) A!ai... A!ok[A!mp- »Sep 1 n'ip]
 where cp, jt, ai,...,ok, ai,...,an are as described in (CP!) above. In
 Church's formulation this last principle, (UI!2), without the
 quantifier prefix on the predicate variables occurring (free)
 in <p is an axiom schema, and (CP!), without the same initial
 quantikfier prefix, is a theorem schema of that system. In the
 present system, however, the quantifier prefix cannot be
 dropped without assuming
 V !qj A ßi . . . A ßi [Qj (ßi, . . . ,ßi) aj (ßi
 for each j^k, where çj and aj are distinct i-place predicate
 variables, for some positive integer i. The point of the dis-
 tinction once again is that in Church's system all predicate
 variables, bound or free, refer only to predicative properties
 and relations.
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 Let us now return to Russell's argument and reconsider
 membership as one of the values of the 2-place predicate vari-
 ables satisfying, besides extensionality, the conversion prin-
 ciple for sets that are the extensions of predicative properties:
 (Conv!) A!jtAa[ae{ß:ji(ß) } <-> jc(cx)]
 Because of the obvious impredicative character of any rela-
 tion satisfying (Conv!), we take 'g' in this context to be a free
 2-place predicate variable not existentially posited to repre-
 sent a predicative relation. Indeed, instead of inconsistency,
 all that Russell's argument shows in the present context is
 that any relation satisfying (Conv!) must for that reason be
 impredicative. For by (UI!) and (Conv!) it follows that non-
 self-membership is not a predicative property:
 ~ V !jt Aa[ji(a) a^a]
 And therefore, by (UI!) and (CP!) membership is not a predi-
 cative relation:
 ~ V!eAaAß[Q(a,ß) <-»aeß]
 Here we have a striking contrast of the syncategorematic
 roll of impredicativity in the present system (as represented
 by means of free predicate variables and constants) with the
 categorial role of impredicativity in standard second order
 logic. Of course, were we to actually construct a set theory
 in the present framework, e.g., by introducing a 2-place pre-
 dicate constant for membership, we should have to extend
 (Conv!) so as to allow conversion with respect to at least cer-
 tain wffs containing 'e' and therefore representing impredi-
 cative conditions. Such an extension would not be the basis
 of an argument against the predicative logic formulated here
 but would rather illustrate one of the special senses in which
 impredicativity might be said to enter at the very foundations
 of mathematics. (17)
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 It is noteworthy that predicate constants not representing
 predicative properties or relations in such applications of the
 logic as envisaged above need not be viewed as descriptive
 or categorial signs. Since they are not substituends of any
 bound variable of the logic such constants do not represent a
 value of any of the bound variables and are in this special
 sense syncategorematic signs akin to logical constants. Free
 predicate variables of course can also always be viewed as
 schema letters and theorems in which they occur as theorem
 schemata, though, as noted earlier, by no means should the
 content of the latter be seen to be representable in the object
 language by their universal closures.
 In addition, in such a set theory as envisaged above, where
 n-tuples of individuals are themselves individuals, we might
 even exclude bound n-place predicate variables for n>l, sin-
 ce predicative n-ary relations can then be construed as predi-
 cative properties of n-tuples of individuals. Only predicative
 or first-order properties or concepts (Begriffe) need then re-
 main as the "unsaturated" entities of the original Fregean
 framework. But to banish these too in the end would be to
 depart completely from a Fregean theory of predication.
 § 3 Semantics:
 Where L is a language, i.e., a set of individual and predicate
 constants, we understand U= <A,R,<X > f > to be
 n neco - {0} f
 a model suited to L if (1) A is a non-empty set (called the uni-
 verse of U), (2) R is a function with L as domain and such that
 RQgA whenever Ç is an individual constant in L and, for each
 positive integer n, R(n)ç;An whenever jt is an n-place predi-
 cate constant in L, and (3) <X > is a family of sets
 n new- {0}
 indexed by co - {0}, the set of positive integers (natural num-
 bers other than 0) and for each positive integer n, Xn is a set
 of subsets of An. The set Xn represents the predicative n-ary
 relations of the model. Observe that an n-place predicate con-
 stant jt need not represent a predicative relation of the model,
 i.e., R(jt) need not be a member of Xn. For convenience, we
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 set Uy = Ar i.e. is the universe of the model U, and when-
 ever Ô is an individual or predicate constant in L, we set
 ôu = R(ô).
 By an assignement in U of values (drawn from U) to vari-
 ables we understand a function a with the set of individual
 and predicate variables as its domain and such that (1) û(a)eU^
 whenever a is an individual variable, and (2) û(ji)cu^n when-
 ever jt is an n-place predicate variable for some positive inte-
 ger n. Note that the value of an n-place predicate variable
 need not be a predicative relation of the model. By a( ) we
 z
 understand the assignment which is exactly like a except in
 its assigning z to the variable 'i.
 Where L is a language, U = <A,R,<X > > is a
 n nEd) - {0}
 model suited to L, and a is an assignment in Ü, the extension in
 U with respect to a of a variable or constant Ô in L, in symbols
 ext (ô, U, a), is a(ô) if ô is a variable and 0^ if ô is a constant
 in L. Satisfaction in U by a of a wff qp of L is recursively defined
 in the usual way: (1) for terms Ķ rļ of L, û satisfios Ç = rļ in U
 iff ext (Ç, U, a) = ext (rļ, Ü, û); (2) where nŒco - {0}, Jt is an
 n-place predicate variable or constant in L and Çi,...,Çn are
 terms of L, a satisfies jt(Çi,...,Çn) in U iff <extt (Çi, U, û),..., ext
 (Çn, il, û)> œ ext (jt, U, û); (3) for a wff cp of L, û satisfies ~(p
 in U iff û does not satisfy qp im U; (4) for wffs qp, op of L, û satis-
 fies (cp -> ip) in U iff either û does not satisfy qp in I or û satis-
 fies ip in U,- (5) for qp a wff of L and a an individual variable,
 û satisfies Aaqp in U iff for each xeU^, û(a) satisfies qp in
 U; and for qp a wff and Jt an n-place predicate variable, n a
 positive integer, û satisfies A Jjtqp in U iff for all FeXn, ûÔ satis-
 fies qp in U. Finally, truth in U as a semantic property of wffs
 of L is defined as satisfaction in U by every assignment in U.
 Note that the truth (in U) of a wff with free predicate variables
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 is not equivalent to the truth (in U) of its universal closure,
 since predicate variables may have properties and relations as
 values that are not predicative (in U).
 Because predicativity is immanent to the logistic system to
 be formulated, the model theory presented here is not intended
 to specify the exact meaning of that concept. At best, as with
 model-theoretic semantics in general, it purports to constitute
 a set-theoretical representation of the system's logical struc-
 ture by means of certain invariant semantical features. (18) But
 to do so, a further condition must be imposed: the predicative
 properties and relations of a model must be closed under all
 first-order (predicative) logical operations. Or, equivalently,
 every instance of (CP!) must be true in the model. Those
 models for which this further condition holds will be said to be
 normal. (") Validity, or the relevant invariant semantic feature,
 is then identified with truth in every normal model, i.e., a wff
 of a language L is valid if it is true in every normal model
 suited to L.
 The following semantic lemma will be useful in proving
 completeness. Its proof, which we omit here, is by a simple
 inductive argument on the structure of cp.
 Semantic Lemma: If a is an assignment in U and U is a model
 a a
 suited to a language of which qp[ ] and qp[ 1 are wffs, where
 Ç 7t
 the substitutions are proper, then:
 OL a
 1) û( ) satisfies (p in U iff û satisfies <p[ J in U; and
 6Xt(Ç, U, ûj Ç
a
2) o( „ ) satisfies œ in il iff a satisfies opí T 1 in U. ext(ji, „ U, a) T u
 § 4. Axioms and Theorems:
 As the axioms of our formulation we take (CP!) and universal
 generalization of all wffs of any of the following forms:
 (Al) <p -*■ (ip <p)
 (A2) (<p [t|> -* x]) -> ([<p -> i|>] -»• [q> -» yj)
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 (A3) - >~cp) - i ► (cp - > ip)
 (A4) Aa(cp - > ip) - > ( Aa cp -» Aa 'p)
 (A5) A !jt(cp - > ip) - > ( A ÎJicp - > A ÎJtxp)
 (A6) cp -> Aacp, where a is not free in cp,
 (A7) <p -» A !jtcp, where jt is not free in cp,
 (A8) VaÇ s a, where a does not occur in Ç,
 (A9) t = iļ- » (cp- >'p), where cp, are atomic wffs and ip is
 obtained from cp by replacing an oc-
 currence of iļ in qp by Ç.
 Theorems are generated in the usual manner as terminal
 wffs of proof sequences the constituents of which are either
 axioms or obtained from preceding wffs of the sequence by
 modus ponens, the only inference rule of the system. A set T
 of wffs is said to yieid a wff cp, in symbols rVcp, if there are
 a natural number n and n wffs ipo,.../ipn-i in T such that
 (opo - ► (ipi (ipn-i - » cp)...)) is a theorem. (When n = 0,
 this last wff is to be cp itself.)
 Because of (Al)-(A3)r every tautologous wff is a theorem.
 Moreover, because every (universal) generalization of an
 axiom is an axiom and, by (A4)-(A5), generalization is pre-
 served by modus ponens, the rule of generalization (for pre-
 dicate and individual variables) is derivable. Then, utilizing
 generalization and (A4)-(A7) in a simple inductive argument
 on the structure of wffs, the interchange law for provably equi-
 valent wffs is derivable. Leibniz' law,
 (LL) 1-1 = Tļ->(<J)^T|>)
 where comes from cp by replacing one or more free occur-
 rences of iļ by a free occurrence of Ç, is now provable by an
 induction on the subwffs of cp. In the atomic case, (LL) is
 obtained from (A9) and sentential logic; otherwise, (LL) is
 obtained by an inductive argument utilizing sentential logic,
 (A4)-(A7) and generalization.
 Given (LL), the principle of universal instantiation of a term
 for a generalized individual variable,
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 (UI-1) hAcxc p-»q>["]
 is derivable. For by repeated application of (LL), [Ç = a - >
 a
 (qp^xp[ç])] is provable, and therefore by generalization on a,
 sentential logic, axioms (A4), (A6), and (A8), (UI-1) follows.
 And with (UI-1), generalization, (A4), (A6), sentential logic and
 the interchange rule for provably equivalent wffs, the rule for
 rewriting bound individual variables follows.
 By a similar argument, the second order analogues of uni-
 versal instantiation, (UI!), (Ulte), and the rewrite rule for bound
 predicate variables are ~lso provable. The analogue of (LL)
 required is:
 Ji(alf...fan)
 (LL2) I- A ai . . . A an[jt (ai, . . . ,an) qp] - > [op S 'p] .
 <P
 which is proved by an inductive argument on the subwffs of
 'p. (20) If ip is atomic, (LL2) follows by n applications of (UI-1);
 otherwise, (LL2) follows by the inductive hypothesis, sentential
 logic, generalization, (A4)-((A7) and the fact that the substitu-
 tion is voided (in which case (LL2) is tautologous) if ip begins
 with a universally quantified variable (other than ai,...,an)
 which occurs free in qp. If k does not occur free in cp, then by
 generalization on (LL2) sentential logic, (A5) and (A7), the fol-
 lowing qualified form of (UI!) is obtained:
 z «(aj,. ..,an)
 ł- VijtAai... Aan[jt(ai,...,an) -wp] - > [Aljnp -» S ap]
 This form suffices to establish the rewrite rule for bound
 predicate variables from which the unqualified form of (UI!)
 follows by a rewrite of the bound occurrence of Jt in the ante-
 cedent of the qualified form to some n-place predicate variable
 a new to (p. To prove the rewrite rule, let qp in the above form
 be a(ai,...,an), where a is an n-place predicate variable not oc-
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 curring in A !jnp. Then by generalization, (A5) and (A7) applied
 to this instance of the qualified form,
 h- A!oV!jiAai... Aan[jt(ai,...fan) -o a(ai,...,an)] - » (Aijnp- >
 Aloapl"])
 O
 and therefore, by (CP!),
 h A !jtop A !<njj[ ]
 a
 from which, together with the interchange rule for provably
 equivalent wffs, the rewrite rule follows, and, accordingly,
 (UI!) is also thereby established. To obtain (UÜ2) where «p,
 the substituend, contains no predicate constants or the identity
 sign and no bound predicate variables, we need only apply to
 (UI!) the rule of generalization (for each predicate variable free
 in cp) and then by (A5), (CP!) and modus ponens, (Ulfe) follows.
 Neither (UI!) nor (UÜ2) justifies the substitution rule:
 (S) if i - iļ>, then i-S i|>
 even when cp contains no bound predicate variables. Yet,
 whether <p contains bound predicate variables or not, this rule
 is derivable (whether jt is a predicate variable or a predicate
 constant). For suppose xif"Xk is a Pr°°f °f ^ Rewrite each
 X¡ in this proof to a wff which contains no bound variable
 in common with cp. By selecting enough new variables not
 occurring in either cp or any ~/j, this rewriting can be done
 uniformly throughout the entire proof sequence so that bound
 occurrences of the same variable are rewritten throughout
 to bound occurrences of the same new variable. The resulting
 sequence is now a proof of tļ>', since where jy is an
 axiom, X.' is also an axiom and where x¡ is obtained by modus
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 ponens from preceding wffs of the original sequence %. is
 obtained by modus ponens from the rewrites of the same wffs.
 Now replace each wff x! °f this new proof sequence by
 S % a substitution which is proper in each case since
 there can be no clash of bound variables between <p and
 *(«1
 The new sequence is now a proof of S tp', since the
 <P
 substitution of q> (with respect to the variables ai,...,an) for free
 occurrences of m in an axiom results is an axiom, and modus
 ponens, because of the rewriting, preserves the substitution
 *(<*!
 throughout. Finally, by the rewrite rule, S ij/ can be
 <p
 transformed to S ii>, unless there is a clash of variables,
 <p
 in which case the original substitution was void and (S) is a
 trivial redundancy.
 It is noteworthy that adding (S) to Church's formulation of
 predicative second order logic results in a system equivalent
 to standard second order logic ("), and thus (S) would in effect
 nullify that system's basic motivation. Not so with the present
 formulation. And the reason essentially is that free predicate
 variables and predicate constants may represent impredicative
 content even though bound predicate variables range only over
 predicative properties and relations. That content, as noted
 in the introduction, need not be construed categorially.
 Compare in this regard the nominalist who eschews all bound
 predicate variables and who interprets free predicate variables
 as schema letters. Predicate constants for such a nominalist
 do not represent categorial content but are instead a special
 type of syncategorematic sign. (Cf. [5]) Yet the substitution
 rule, (S), barring bound predicate variables, is valid for this
 nominalist. Indeed, for him the categorial content represented
 by quantification over properties and relations is replaced by
 a formal content immanent to the logistic system and repre-
 sented by a metalinguistic quantification over predicates and
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 (open) wffs. The (metalinguistic) substitution rule is in effect
 the nominalists' (weaker) replacement of the categorial prin-
 ciple of universal instantiation of wffs for generalized predicate
 variables.
 Analogously the (metalinguistic) rule (S) for the present for-
 mulation of predicative second order logic amounts to a
 (weaker) replacement of the categorial principle (UI) of stan-
 dard second order logic. Impredicative contexts, i.e., wffs con-
 taining essential occurrences of bound predicate variables, are
 allowed here a logistic efficacy which is not null but which
 need not be interpreted categorially.
 Before concluding this section, we shall need for our proof
 of completeness two further derivable rules regarding general-
 ization. Where Ç is a term and n is a predicate variable or
 constant neither of which occur in any wff in T, then:
 (a) if IV<p[ ], then rVAacp;
 (b) if rV<p[ ], then Th-Aacp.
 ji
 These rules are proved in the usual manner which we shall
 omit repeating here. Similarly, we omit proof of the deduction
 theorem which is easily seen to hold by the usual argument.
 § 5. Soundness and Completeness:
 Proof of the soundness of our axioms relative to the proposed
 semantics is straightforward. For, by definition, (CP!) is true
 in every normal model and is therefore valid. The remaining
 axioms, (A1)-(A9), are easily seen to be true (by definition of
 satisfaction) in every model (in the language of which they
 are wffs), whether normal or not, and, accordingly (A1)-(A9)
 are valid. ((A6)-(A7) require noting that an assignment's satis-
 faction of a wff depends on the variables free in that wff and
 no others.) Finally, since modus ponens preserves validity,
 every theorem is therefore valid.
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 Before proceeding to our proof of completeness, it is note-
 worthy to point out that each instance of (CP!) is vacuously
 true in a model with no predicative properties and relations,
 and that therefore such models are normal. (s) Moreover,
 since normalcy is not required for the remaining axioms or
 for modus ponens, the following wff:
 (Nullln) ~ VÎJiAai... Aan[jī(air...,an) -o- a(ai,...,an)]
 is therefore consistent, where n is a positive integer and n, a
 are distinct n-place predicate variables. The free occurrence
 of a in (Null !n) indicates a schematic or metalinguistic quanti-
 fication over all n-ary relations (representable by wffs of the
 system) to the effect that none of them are predicative. That
 (Null!n) is consistent here is as it should be, though of course
 in Church's formulation (Null!n) is not consistent. That formula-
 tion, however, represents a constructive theory of predication,
 while the present system represents a realist theory of predica-
 tion along Fregean lines. And for the latter type of framework,
 whether or not there exists a predicative n-ary relation for any
 given positive integer n is clearly a contingent matter. (Expe-
 rience, of course, may verify that for certain positive integers,
 e.g., 1 or 2, there exist predicative properties or relations of
 that degree.)
 Completeness Theorem : Every consistent set of wffs is si-
 multaneously satisfiable in some normal model.
 Proof : Suppose T is a consistent set of wffs of some language
 L, and let X be the least infinite ordinal equinumerous with or
 greated than L. As usual, we supplement L with new individual
 constants Ço,...,^,...(neX) and, for each neto - {0}, new n-place
 predicate constants jt°,...,jť'...(neX). Call the resulting lan-
 guage L'.
 Let 2i,...,2n,...(|j.eX) be an ordering of the set of wffs of L'
 of the form Vcup of V!o<p. By ordinal recursion, we define the
 chain ro,...JV..([ii=X) as follows: (1) F0 = r¡ (2) if U rVU{2v}
 (IEV
 is not consistent, then T = U F ; (3) if U T U{2 } is con-
 V ļiev 'L ļiGV 'l V
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 sistent, then:
 (a) if 2 = Vacp, for some wff cp of L' and some individual
 V
 a
 variable a, then T = U T U{q)[ ]}, where i is the least or-
 v jiev y, £
 dinal such that £ does not occur in any member of U F ü
 i fxev ļi
 (2 }¡
 V
 (b) if 2 = V !o<f> for some wff <p of L' and some n-place pre-
 V
 o
 dicate variable a, then T = U T U{<p[ ], V!(?Aai... Aan[e(ou,
 v ļiev ^ Jin
 i»
 ...,an) jc"(ai, ..,an)] }, where q is the first n-place predicate 'i
 variable different from a, ai,...,an are the first n individual
 variables, and i is the least ordinal such that jťj does not
 occur in any member of U r U{2 }.
 (tev (i v
 By induction, we show first that each T is consistent, for
 vel If U r U{2 } is not consistent, then T is consistent by
 jtev ļi V v
 definition and the inductive hypothesis. Suppose then that
 U r U {2 } is consistent but that T is not consistent. Then,
 (tev (iv v
 in case 2 = Voup, by the deduction theorem
 V
 u r I - q)["|
 (iev n Ç
 and therefore, by generalization on a term which does not
 occur in any wff in U r ,
 (iev (i
 U r H Aa~qi
 l*ev n
 which is impossible since then U r U{2 } is not consistent.
 (iev n v
 On the other hand, if 2 = V !o<p, then by the deduction theo-
 V
 n ra 1
 rem U T h- VîçAai... Aan[Q(aiř...,an) 31 nl 1 y,ev 'i 1 31
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 and therefore by generalization on a predicate constant not
 occurring in any wff in UT, (A5) and (CP!),
 UGV ¿i
 U r hA !o~cp
 u
 which is also impossible by assumption. Accordingly, not only
 is each r consistent but UT is too. Hence, by Linden-
 V U GE V H
 baum's lemma we conclude that there is a maximally consistent
 set K of wffs of L' such that U T CK,
 jiev ft
 We now proceed to construct the appropriate model based
 upon K. Where rļ is a term of L', let [r|] = {£: £ is a term of L'
 and T) = ŠeK}. If rļ = £eK, then, since identity is an (impre-
 dicative) equivalence relation [rļ] = [£]. Also, note that by (A8)
 and the way K was constructed [rļ] = [Ç ], for some ieX. Ac-
 i
 cordingly, {[rļ]: rļ is a term of L'} = {[£]: teX}, which we
 i
 shall identify with A, the domain or universe of discourse.
 Now let R be that function with the set of individual and
 predicate constants of L' as domain and which is such that
 R(rļ) = [rļ], for each individual constant rļ of L', and, for each
 n-place predicate constant q of L', R(ç) = { <[r)i],...,[rļn]> :
 e(rļi
 n new - {0} , ,
 family such that Xn = {R(q): q is an n-place predicate constant
 of L' and for some n-place predicate variable a and distinct
 individual variables ai,...,an, VloAai... Aan[a(ai,...,an) -*>p(ai,...,
 an)]eK). Finally, let a be that function with the set of variables
 as domain and which is such that a (a) = [a], for each individual
 variable a, and for each n-place predicate variable a, a (a) =
 { <[rļi],...,[rļn] > : a(rļi,...,rļn)eK}. We set U = <A,R, <X >
 n new
 , , > and note that by definition U is a model suited to L'
 - {0} , ,
 and that a is an assignment in 11. Note too that for each term rļ
 of L', ext(rļ, U, û) = [rļ], and for each n-place predicate variable
 or constant q, ext(g, U, 0) = { <[r)i],...,[rļn]>: e(rļi,...,rļn)eK}.
 We now show by induction that if cp is a wff of L', then a
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 satisfies q> in U iff cpeK. The induction is on the number of
 logical constants occurring in <p. If <p is an identity 11 = 1, note
 that a satisfies tļ = % in U iff ext(r), U, a) = ext(£, U, a), i.e., iff
 fo] = [5] and hence iff ç = t|eK. If <p is an atomic wff of the
 form p(T|i,...,Tin), then û satisfies e(rļi,. . -,rļn) in U iff <ext(rļi, U, û),
 ....ext^n, U, a)> eext(e, U, ), i.e., iff e(rļi
 negation or conditional, the conclusion follows from the in-
 ductive hypothesis. Suppose then that q> is of the form Aaxļ>
 and that a satisfies Aoiļ> in U. If Aaip^K, then, since K is
 maximally consistent, ~Am|)e K, and therefore from the way
 that K was constructed, eK, for some i,eX. But then
 iļ>[ ]^K and therefore, by the inductive hypothesis û does not
 i
 satisfy Tp[a ] in U, from which it follows by the semantic lemma
 i
 of S3 that aí" ) does not satisfy cp in U, which is impos-
 I
 sible by assumption. Conversely, if AaipeK and û does not
*
atisfy * A cup in U, then for some ieX, a( (1 Ì does not * ext(Ç (1 U, a)
 i
 satisfy in U¡ and therefore, by the same semantic lemma, a
 does not satisfy tpH in U. But then, by the inductive hypo-
 i
 thesis, 'p[a]^K, which is impossible by assumption, (UI-1) and
 I
 the fact that K is maximally consistent. Finally, suppose tp is
 of the form A!<nļ>, for some n-place predicate variable o, and
 that o satisfies A loop in U but that A Then V!o~t|igK,
 a
 and therefore, from the way K was constructed,
 k
 and VlpAai... Aan[ç(ai,...,an) (ai,...,an)]eK, for some isL
 But then, by definition of U, ext(n , Ü, o)sXn, and, accordingly,
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 o
 û( ) satisfies ip in U, by assumption. Therefore, by the
 ext(jin, U, a)
 i
 a




 the inductive hypothesis, ip[ 1gK, which is impossible since
 ji»
 i
 K would then be inconsistent. For the converse direction,
 suppose AîaipeK but that a does not satisfy A !<np in U. Then
 there is an n-place predicate constant q such that R(g)eXn and
 G
 û( ) does not satisfy i|> in U, that is, by the same seman-
 ext(Q, U, û)
 o
 tic lemma, û does not satisfy ip[ ] in a. Therefore, by the in-
 Q
 a 
 uctive hypothesis, 'p[ ]^K, which is impossible since 'p[ ]gK
 q Q
 by (UI!) and the fact that R(ç)eXn, i.e., the fact that VlaAai...
 Aan[a(ai,...ran)o9(ai,...,an)]eK. This concludes the inductive
 argument on the wffs of L'.
 Since K is maximally consistent every instance of (CP!) is in
 K, and therefore every instance of (CP!) is true in U. Conse-
 quently, U is normal. Since T = ToQ U T çk, T is simulta-
 ji
 neously satisfiable by û in U. (Q.E.D.)
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 FOOTNOTES
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 (2) Cf. Cocchiarella [2] for a discussion of the difference between the
 two forms of Russell's paradox and especially for an analysis and resolu-
 tion (without resorting to type theory) of the paradox of predication. The
 present paper, as well as Cocchiarella [3], can be viewed as disarming
 the paradox of membership.
 (s) Frege, however, did take predicates (or open wffs) to be "arguments"
 of quantifiers which he called second and third level "concepts". But
 quantifiers can be commuted, iterated and occur within the scope of one
 another and must not therefore be confused with predicates (or open wffs)
 for which commutation, iteration and scope inclusion are syntactically
 inapplicable. In addition, concepts do not "fall under" (but are said to
 "fall within") second and third level "concepts", so that they certainly
 are not "arguments" of the latter in this sense. Second and third level
 "concepts" are really logical or syncategorematical "concepts" and do not
 correspond to the concepts (propositional functions) of any order in Russell's
 ramified hierarchy. (The syncategorematic expressions of a logistic system
 are understood here to be those expressions of the system that are not
 permissible substituends of any bound variable of any syntactic type -
 though in some systems they might be substituends of free (schema)
 variables.)
 (4) We should distinguish at least two kinds of content that expressions
 of a formal system might have. The first is generally called descriptive, but
 historically has been called categorial, which we prefer here since even
 without (applied) descriptive constants the content is still indicated by
 bound variables. (Hence our reference to categorial content.) The second
 is generally called logical or formal, or, traditionally, syncategorematic
 and is understood to be immanent to the logistic system in question. This
 latter content is usually said to be null or non-existent because it is not
 denoted or designated by corresponding constants, or, equivalently, because
 it is not indicated by any type of bound variable. (It may however be «in-
 dicated» in a secondary sense by free or schematic variables, and therefore
 also by constants that are substituends of these free or schematic variables.)
 This rather standard view is untenable, however; for if the corresponding or
 associated expressions have logistic efficacy in the system, that fact can
 be accounted for only in terms of their representing content of some sort.
 On the other hand, because of its immanency, this content need not be
 therefore accorded categorial existence, i.e., it need not be indicated by
 bound variables. Our point here, however, is that categorial existence
 is not the only philosophically viable notion of existence. In ramified type
 theory (without the axiom of reducibility), impredicativity has neither cate-
 gorial nor syncategorial existence. In the new predicative second order
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 logic, impredicativity has syncategorial but not categorial existence. In
 standard second order logic, impredicativity has categorial existence.
 (5) A perspicuous representation of this logistic efficacy is the rule (S)
 of substitution of wffs for free (schematic) predicate variables or constants
 occurring in theorems. (Cf. § 4 below for a description and derivation of
 (S).) This rule, though derivable in the predicative second order logic
 formulated here, is not derivable in Church formulation. Indeed, its addi-
 tion there as a new rule results in standard, and not predicative, second
 order logic. This is not the case in the new formulation given here.
 (#) The principle of universal instantiation, (UI), of wffs - those contain-
 ing as well as those not containing bound predicate variables - for a
 generalized predicate variable is now both formulábale and valid when
 the generalized predicate variable is bound by the standard quantifier. This
 principle implies the weaker rule (S) and therefore contains, and goes
 beyond, the logistic efficacy of that rule.
 (7) Cf. Cocchiarella [3], §§5-6, for a discussion and development of this
 richer framework.
 (8) By an essential bound occurrence we mean that, other than by re-
 writing, the bound predicate variable in question cannot be eliminated
 from <p without resulting in some non-equivalent wff, that is, cp is not
 provably equivalent in the system to a wff which contains no bound
 occurrences of predicate variables.
 (®) Instead of (CP), the same posit can be made by allowing <p, with
 respect to the distinct variables alf...,an (as argument indicators), to be a
 substituend in the principle of universal instantiation of a wff for a
 generalized predicate variable:
 (UI) AjnJ>-+S$*(a1,...,an)t|>
 It is known that (UI) and (CP) are equivalent axiomatic alternatives for
 standard second order logic (relative of course to the remaining axioms).
 (10) Note that <p is a substituend of such a predicate variable (occurring
 in <p itself) iff (CP) holds regarding (p. Cf. the preceding footnote.
 (n) This dependency is at least twofold: it presupposes on the one hand
 the notion of an essential occurrence of a bound predicate variable and,
 secondly, the use of (CP) or, equivalently, (UI) both to posit the existence
 of impredicative properties and relations represented by (open) wffs con-
 taining bound predicate variables and to warrant the substitutability of
 wffs for the bound predicate variables they contain.
 (lř) Frege's special "set theoretical" axiom, viz. his basic law (V):
 (V) AjiAa({a: Ji(a)}"{a: a(a) }<-»Aa[ji(a)«-»a(a)]
 is easily seen to be derivable from our existential posit of a membership
 relation satisfying extensionality and (Conv). Conversely, our existential
 posit follows from (V) and the following impredicative instance of (CP):
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 V Œ Ac* Aß(aeß«-»Vji[ß = { y: ji(y) } a. jc(ct) ] )
 (We follow standard practice throughout and, for example, write aG|3'
 instead of 'e(a,ß)'.) Note that the posited membership relation is only
 impredicatively specifiable.
 (13) Since membership is existentiallv posited, we view 'œ' here as an
 instantiated 2-place predicate variable fulfilling the existential posit.
 (14) Stipulating that a^a is a permissible substituend of a generalized
 1 -place predicate variable (and therefore represents a value of that
 variable) is equivalent to the above posit that nonself-membership is a
 property. This is but a special case of the equivalence of (CP) and (UI)
 cited earlier.
 (l5) Extensionality also involves essential occurences of bound predicate
 variables:
 (Ext) An Aa( Aa[ae{ ß: jt(ß) } <-> ae{ß: a(ß) }] {ß: ji(ß) } = { ß : a(ß) })
 (I6) This fact is of course all the more obvious if we were to take Frege's
 basic law (V) as our initial posit. For then, as noted earlier, membership
 can be posited only by an impredicative instance of (CP) ; and without
 membership so posited, (Conv) is unavailable for Russell's argument.
 (17) Cf. [31, for further discussion of this issue.
 (18) Throughout this paper, 'semantics' is used only in the sense of model
 theory.
 (19) Since (CP!) contains no descriptive constants, relativization to the
 wffs of a model's language is unnecessary in the definition of normalcy.
 (2°) we assume throughout that a1(...,an are pairwise distinct individual
 variables.
 (21) Since free predicate variables have only predicative properties or
 relations as values in Church's system, A !jtip -> is a theorem of that
 formulation. Applying (S) to this theorem results in (UI), the general in-
 stantiation law for all wffs, those containing as well as those not containing
 bound predicate variables, and (UI), as already pointed out, is equivalent
 to (CP).
 (22) Note that each instance of (CP!) must begin with a non-null universal
 quantifier prefix on the predicate variables occurring free in the compre-
 hending wff. The prefix must be non-null since no predicate variable can
 be bound by quantifiers in the comprehending wff; nor can = or any
 predicate constant occur therein.
